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"Secrecy Has No Excuse": The Florida Land
Boom, Tourism, and the 1926 Smallpox
Epidemic in Tampa and Miami
By Eric Jarvis
istorians frequently have identified the period from
roughly 1921 to 1926 in Florida as the Land Boom, or simply, the Boom. It is usually analyzed through the prism of
the Roaring Twenties in the United States, a time best symbolized
in the state by a frenzied real estate market, overinflated land
prices, and massive speculation. Miami and south Florida received
much of the attention, but there were important aspects of boomtime mania in many parts of the state, including the Tampa area.
A booster-driven public relations blitz made up of promotional
advertising, business propaganda, and glowing press releases
fuelled the Boom. The "get rich quick" possibilities of the era and
the magnificence of the state's climate and natural environment
also played a role. Consequently, Florida became a tourist magnet,
especially in the areas around Miami and Tampa, bringing winter
visitors, a growing permanent population, and increased outside
investment.
Along with the hoopla, phoniness, and outright fraud of the
time, the early Twenties in Florida also represented a period of
maturation and modernization, centered on urban growth and a
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significant service-based economy. Cities such as Miami and
Tampa increased in population and in prosperity, even though
they differed in their economic and demographic nature.
Of the two, Tampa had the more developed and diversified
economy that included an industrial base built around cigar manufacturing. Its multicultural population consisted of whites and
Mrican-Americans, as well as Spanish, Italians, and Cubans, both
black and white . Miami, by contrast, was less diversified and more
dependent on tourism. It lacked any important industry other
than those centered on the service trades. It was also less ethnically diverse, being divided primarily between whites and blacks, with
the latter community split between native-born and those of
Bahamian origin. City officials sought more economic diversity
during the early 1920s, but met little success.1
A different tone developed in the last two years of the Boom,
1925 and 1926, as doubts crept in about the duration and stability
of the era's prosperity. Floridians increasingly feared that the
Boom was wavering, or even collapsing, and many grew uneasy
about the immediate future. This was matched throughout the
state by an accumulating annoyance over what were called
Northern press reports criticizing Florida and predicting (even
hoping for) the collapse of the Boom. Problems emerged as evidence mounted concerning land frauds, failing state banks, overburdened public facilities, and overwhelmed transportation
1.

William W. Rogers, "Fortune and Misfortune: The Paradoxical Twenties ," in
The New History ofFlorida, ed. Michael Gannon (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 1996), 287-303; PaulS. George, "Passage to the New Eden: Tourism
in Miami From Flagler Through Everest G. Sewell," Florida Historical Quarterly
59, no. 4 (April 1981): 440-463; Paul S. George "Brokers, Binders, and
Builders: Greater Miami 's Boom of the Mid-1920s," Florida Historical Quarterly
65, no. 1 (July 1986): 27-51; Frank B. Sessa, "Miami in 1926," Tequesta 16
(1956): 15-36; Frank B. Sessa, "An ti-Florida Propaganda and Counter
Measures During the 1920s," Tequesta, 21 (1961): 41 -51; James M. Ricci ,
"Boasters, Boosters and Boom: Popular Images of Florida in the 1920s,"
Tampa Bay History 6, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 1984) : 31-55; Eric Jarvis, "Foreigners
From the Far North: Canadians in Miami and South Florida During the
1920s," Tequesta 67 (2007), 64-66; Raymond B. Vickers, Panic in Paradise:
Florida's Banking Crash of 1926 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1994) ; Frank Parker Stockbridge and John Holliday Perry, Florida in the
Making (New York: De Bower Publishing, 1926), 188-93, 195-99, 201; Gary R.
Mormino and George E. Pozzetta, The Immigrant World of Ybor City: Italians and
Their Neighbors in Tampa, 1885-1985 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1987), 9-11 , 43-45, 49-51, 54-60, 70, 78-79; and Nancy A. Hewitt, Southern
Discomfort: Women's Activism in Tampa, Florida, 1880s-1920s (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 2001) , 7-9, 17-21, 32-34.
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systems, all of which garnered attention in the rest of the country.
Bad weather also added to this dismal picture, even before the
September 1926 hurricane that is often credited with providing
the coup de grace of the boom era. The anxious mood of the time
can be captured in the constant reassurances and defensive rejoinders of Florida politicians, business leaders and the state's newspapers. They tried to convince non-Floridians, and probably
themselves, that all was well and that the good times would continue unabated. This was particularly true in south Florida, where
many argued that nothing was wrong, that the Boom was not over,
or conversely, that it never had been a boom in the first place.
Some Floridians maintained that the economic growth of the early
1920s would simply continue, albeit at a slower pace. 2
During January and February of 1926, in the midst of this jittery atmosphere, rumors began to circulate of a smallpox outbreak
in a number of cities across the state-the last thing that Florida's
promoters wanted to hear. The presence of a loathsome, disfiguring, and potentially deadly disease would add significantly to the
bad news of the time. Florida's political and business leaders especially did not want the media attention and negative publicity that
undoubtedly would follow in the wake of any official announcement of an epidemic. Thus, the fight against smallpox would take
place within the framework of economic concerns. As a result, the
ensuing debate pitted public health against fiscal health. A modernizing system of disease control had to function within a modernizing tourist driven economy. The publicity that public health
officials claimed necessary to fight the outbreak ran counter to the
need to maintain a positive image of the state necessary to protect
the continuation of prosperity. Smallpox, therefore, affected not
only individuals, but also endangered Florida's boom era.
The smallpox epidemic began quietly in late December of
1925 and only became widespread in January and February of
1926. While the disease spread to many parts of Florida, including
Jacksonville and West Palm Beach, the largest number of cases and
the most publicity about them occurred in Miami and Tampa. In
those two cities health officials reacted more dramatically than
elsewhere and generated the most significant amount of contra2.

Stockbridge and Perry, Florida in the Making, 195-99, 201; Rogers, "Fortune
and Misfortune," 287-303; Vickers, Panic in Paradise; George, "Passage to the
New Eden," 440-63; and Sessa, "Anti-Florida Propaganda," 41-51.
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versy over how to battle the outbreak. In both cities, the key issue
involved the amount of reporting that should be allowed, since any
adverse press coverage had the potential to damage the economy.
Despite the wishes of state authorities, smallpox, like most contagious diseases, did not conform to economic planning, and took
its own course. National health data showed that Florida experienced more cases of smallpox in 1926 than any other state, with an
estimated 2,525 cases. 3 On the positive side, it had received a mild
strain of the disease called Variola minor or "alastrim," a type that
had originally entered the United States in the 1890s through
Pensacola and had become the most prevalent strain throughout
North America thereafter. A more deadly strain, Variola major, still
could strike, however, and could even be mixed into a Variola
minor outbreak. 4
Variola major had, in fact, ravaged parts of the United States in
the 1920s, with deadly outbreaks occurring in Detroit (in 1924 with
163 deaths), Minneapolis ( 1925, 144 deaths), and Milwaukee
(1926, 86 deaths). 5 The worst outbreak occurred in California at
the same time as the epidemic in Florida. California experienced
the second largest number of smallpox cases that year (2,432), but
suffered the highest death toll because of the strain of smallpox
involved. In Florida, Variola minO'r killed an estimated two to six
people; in California Variola major killed 231 people. 6 The imprecision of Florida's data and the relative mildness of that state's strain

3.
4.

5.

6.

Metropolitan Life Insurance, Statistical Bulletin, February and September
1926; Tampa Tribune, 11 February 1926.
"Smallpox and Vaccination: American Views and Practice," The Lancet 1 (26
March 1927): 671-72; U.S. Public HealthReports42, xlii,no.4 (28January 1927);
journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 86, no. 4 (23 January 1926):
part 1, 282; Florida Health Notes 18, no.4 (April1926): 47, 55, and no. 50 (13
December 1940): 2303-305; MLI, Statistical Bulletin, September 1926; and
Tampa Tribune, 15 January 1926.
J<lorida Health Notes 18, no.4 (April1926): 47, and no. 1 (January 1926): 4, and
no. 5 (May 1926): 63; U.S. Public HealthReports54 , no. 19 (12 May 1939) and
54, no. 25 (23 June 1939); MLI, Statistical Bulletin, June 1926; Miami Daily
News, 5 January 1926; and Tampa Tribune, 12 February 1926.
JAMA 86, no. 14 (3 April1926): part 11 , 1079, and 86, no. 19 (8 May 1926):
part 11 , 1459, and 86, no. 23 (5 June 1926): partll, 1773; Florida Health Notes
18, no. 1 (January 1926): 4, and 18, no. 4 (April 1926): 47, and 18, no. 2
(February 1926): 20; New England journal of Medicine 201 , no. 4 (October
1929): 671-674 (claims that had been 2734 smallpox cases in 1926 California);
MLI, Statistical Bulletin, (September 1926) , (April 1927) ; Miami Daily News, 5
January 1926; Tampa Tribune, 11 , 21, 28 February 1926; and New York Times, 2
April1926.
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played a role in how public officials and business promoters dealt
with the disease.
Throughout the United States during the 1920s, both types of
smallpox afflicted the population in spite of the fact that the preventative use of vaccinations had been successfully practiced
around the world since the eighteenth century. However, most
twentieth-century Americans remained unvaccinated or had not
had the necessary revaccination since childhood. Smallpox outbreaks had limited effects only in New England, where four states
had made vaccination compulsory. In the rest of the United States
a hodgepodge of vaccination laws with varying degrees of enforcement placed citizens at greater or lesser risk. Some states had no
smallpox vaccination laws at all and others had passed laws making
compulsory vaccinations illegal. For many Americans, smallpox
seemed to be a distant threat, while vaccinations appeared to be
unclean, dangerous, or a violation of personal liberty if mandatory. Indeed, anti-vaccination groups, such as the American Medical
Liberty League, ran well organized campaigns against vaccination.7 Disagreements over vaccination often influenced how
Floridians evaluated the smallpox outbreak and its impact on the
state
This can be seen clearly by examining a letter to the editor in
the Tampa Tribune in January, 1926. The letter writer, Dr. Rollin
Jones, shared his views on vaccination, claiming that it was his
"solemn duty" to provide "the facts" regarding the procedure. For
Jones, as for many others, the concept of vaccination was 'Jenner
propaganda" (from the discoverer's name) pushed to sell vaccine.
He contended that while "many of our ablest medical men of today
have shown the utter falsity of its claims, still it retains its hold
upon the medical world and the public mind as no theory or propaganda has ever held before." Using quotations from "the lips and
pens of men who had neither vaccine nor vaccinations for sale," he
then concluded that civilized society should not tolerate a situation
"where the filthy virus of a sick horse, cow or calf has been taken
and passed into the bloodstream of our children and adults." 8 It

7.

8.

Martin Kaufman, "The American Anti-Vaccinationists and Their Arguments,"
Bulletin of the Histary of Medicine, 41(1967): 463-478; Florida Health Notes, 18
(April 1926):4, 48; JAMA 86:10 (6 March 1926): part 1,696; New England
Journal of Medicine, 200:18 (2 May) :945, 223:23 (5 December 1940): 951-952.
Tampa Tribune, 12January 1926.
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was this type of opinion, or varieties of it, that Florida public health
officials had to cope with before and during the 1926 smallpox epidemic.
Across the nation, health authorities battled the disturbing
opposition to, or lack of interest in, getting vaccinated. Even
though the variola vaccine had proven both safe and effective,
most Americans remained unprotected, much to the dismay of the
U.S. Public Health Service. 9 In 1926 the Florida State Board of
Health expressed its frustration by claiming that "People who possess normal intelligence are accepting the protection which vaccination offers and one can truthfully say that only people who are
mentally unbalanced make serious objection to vaccination." 10
The harsh rhetoric reveals the dilemma faced by concerned
health workers who correctly believed that an unvaccinated population represented an opportunity for the introduction and spread
of smallpox. Ironically, it did not help that the most prevalent type
of the disease in America was a relatively mild one, since that simply added to a sense of complacency among some, making them
view vaccination as unnecessary. 11
During the 1920s, Florida's smallpox laws reinforced and
emphasized individual responsibility for dealing with the disease.
In the last session of the state legislature prior to the 1926 outbreak, lawmakers had refused to pass a compulsory vaccination
bill. 12 As a result, the previous law of 1921 remained in effect. It set
out the State Board of Health's regulations, many of which had
been reported widely on by leading medical journals of the era
such as the journal of the American Medical Association, the Southern
Medical journal, and even the British Lancet. The state guidelines
encouraged citizens to get vaccinated against smallpox and even
provided free vaccine for this purpose. At the same time, the law
held every individual personally responsible and warned that the
Board, "would not quarantine smallpox nor would it be responsible for the treatment, maintenance or sustenance of any case of
9.

10.
11.
12.

Florida Health Notes 18, no. 1 Ganuary 1926): 4, and 18, 110.2 (February 1926):
21 , 27, and 18, no. 5 (May 1926): 63;JAMA 86,110. 23 (June 5, 1926): 1773;
New England journal of Medicine ( ll April1929) and 2001, no. 14 (3 October
1929); and MLI, Statistical Bulletin (June 1926).
Florida State Board of Health, 33rd Report (1932): 7, 153; Florida Health Notes
18, no. 3 (March 1926): 34-35; and New York Times, 9 February 1926.
The Lancet (26 March1927): 672; MLI, Statistical Bulletin, (September 1926);
and New York Times, 15 January 1926.
Tampa Tribune, 24January 1926; and New York Times, 29 January 1926.
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smallpox occurring within the limits of the state." The law also
emphasized that vaccination would not "under any circumstances"
be compulsory in Florida. 13
Thus, it was each person's decision whether to get vaccinated
or not and, in a form of "downloading," the State Board passed on
to local health boards the problem of dealing with smallpox victims who had not availed themselves of the free vaccine. In the
winter of 1926, therefore, local boards faced the smallpox outbreak within the milieu set by the 1921 sanitation laws. When the
first cases of smallpox began to be reported in late 1925 and especially in early 1926, it was estimated that less than 20%-25% of the
state's population had been properly vaccinated against the disease.14 A brief history of government public health services
demonstrates an evolution of state and national systems that
began in the late 19th century and matured during the Progressive
Era. The evolution of government public health services at the
state level, and somewhat later, at the national level took place as
medical breakthroughs dovetailed with the increasing centralization and modernization of governments. The chief medical discoveries came from Europe and indicated that specific microbes
and viruses caused specific diseases. This so-called "germ theory"
represented a turning point in the control of epidemics and gave
added significance to the field of public health. Even though
many deadly diseases were already declining either in frequency
or in virulence during this period and despite the fact that the
European discoveries were adopted only slowly by physicians and
scientists in North America, the scientific approach became medical gospel. From this arose the new field of bacteriology and an
enhanced understanding of epidemiology, both of which made
public health boards more accurate and efficient in their dealings
with contagion, sanitation procedures, and rules. Public health
officials focused on cities as the United States became increasingly urbanized. The dramatic increase in urban populations, caused
by both foreign and internal migration led to problems of poor

13.

14.

U.S. Public Health Service, "Smallpox Vaccination Laws, 1927, Florida," 22;
Southern Medical journal (March 1926): xix, 3, 239;JAMA 86, no.5 (30 January
1926): part I, 355; Florida Health Notes 18, no. 2 (February 1926): 19; and
Tampa Tribune, 9 January 1926.
The first recorded case was on December 28, 1925. Tampa Tribune, 8January
1926; and New York Times, 8 January 1926.
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sanitary conditions, overcrowding, inadequate public services,
and health care. 15
These developments fostered a more modern, systematic
approach to public health policy and administration. In an era of
perceived reform and increasing government involvement in society, the belief that every level of government should have a role to
play in combating health problems came to maturity. By the late
nineteenth century and into the first decades of the twentieth century, the age of the "expert" had arrived in medical studies and
public health. Scientific methodology, laboratory-driven research,
and the collection and analysis of health statistics became the
dogma of the new public health movement. City, state or national
health agencies increasingly took over food inspection and coordinated quarantines, mass vaccination drives, and house inspections.
This modernizing health reform included the publication of
health reports, the use of the press to inform the public on disease
problems and the creation of a growing list of legal sanitation and
health rules and regulations that were enacted but not always vigorously enforced. Much of this meant increased government intrusion into individual lives in order to protect the general public.
This included the placarding of houses or stores that contained
diseased individuals, visits by public health nurses and social workers to investigate personal lifestyles and hygiene problems as well
as the enforcement of health regulations. Some people resented,
and even resisted these intrusions, especially in the case of small15.

Gerald N. Grob, The Deadly Truth: A History of Disease in America (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 180-216;James H. Cassedy, Medicine in
America: A Short History' (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1991), 67-124; Joanne Brown, "Crime, Commerce and Contagionism: the
Political Languages of Public Health and the Popularization of Germ Theory
in the United Sates, 1870-1950" in Scientific Authority and Twentieth-Century
America, ed. Ronald G. Walters (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1997) , 53-81; Allan M. Brandt, "'just Say No' : Risk, Behavior and
Disease in Twentieth-Century America," in Scientific Authority and TwentiethCentury America, Walters, 84-88; Alan M. Kraut, Goldberger's War: The Life and
Work of a Public H ealth Crusader (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003),
126-27, 143; Samuel Kelton Roberts Jr., Infectious Fear: Politics, Disease and the
Health Effects of Segregation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2009), 147; and Russell C. Maulitz, "Physician Versus Bacteriologist: The
Ideology of Science in Clinical Medicine ," in The Therapeutic Revolution: Essays
in the Social History of American Medicine, eds. Morris J. Vogel and Charles
Rosenberg (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1979), 91-107. For a
brief but useful overview of this era in medicine see Morris J. Vogel, introduction to The Therapeutic Revolution in Vogel, vii-ix.
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pox vaccination. A new health bureaucracy with public health
police power emerged in order to control and manipulate public
health by law. 16
The federal government had been a reluctant player regarding public health and moved into the field at a slower pace than
cities and states. During the nineteenth century it had established
a system of marine hospitals, overseen by a loosely organized
Marine Hospital Service. The government designed these institutions primarily for the care of sailors and built them in the nation's
major port cities. In 1902 the Service changed its name to the
Public Health and Marine Hospital Service, a reflection of its
widening role beyond sailors' health. The most important change,
however, came in 1912 when the Federal government consolidated all public health entities into the Public Health Service, a more
scientifically sound and systematically focused bureaucracy in
keeping with the ideals of the Progressive Era. This new government entity provided aid to state and local health agencies, conducted medical research in its Hygienic Laboratory, and worked to
control and prevent the interstate spread of epidemic diseasesP
Most states, including those in the South, had formed boards
of health during the 1880s and 1890s. The creation of these boards
in southern states directly resulted from a series of yellow fever epidemics in the region. Since the nineteenth century, cities and
states moved to prevent importation of the disease and enacted
quarantines to stop its spread inland. Health boards assumed the
duties required with mixed results but they were the basis of future
public health reforms. This type of government activity, unique in
an impoverished South, came about primarily, as Margret
Humphreys has argued, because of the economic and commercial
impact of yellow fever. The disease gradually became less prevalent
16.

Cassedy, Medicine in America, 110-16; Brown, "Crime, Commerce, and
Contagionism," 53-56, 64-66; Roberts, Infectious Fear, 80, 141-42, 148-49, 179;
Kraut, Goldberger's War, 143, 220, 241; Maulitz, "Physician Versus
Bacteriologist," 96; Judith W. Leavitt, '"Be Safe, Be Sure': New York City's
Experience with Epidemic Smallpox" in Hives of Sickness: Public Health and
Epidemics in New York City, ed. David Rosner (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1995), 106-109; Margaret Humphreys, Yellow Fever and the
South (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 10, 14-15; and
James H . Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (New York: Free
Press, 1981), 32-34, 41-44.
17. Kraut, Goldberger's War, 201-02, 206-07, 216, 234; Cassedy, Medicine in America,
115-16, Humphreys, Yellow Fever and the South, 12-13, 179-80; and Jones, Bad
Blood, 31-32.
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by the end of the nineteenth century even before its mosquito vector was discovered. Nevertheless, its fearsomeness and dislocating
effects contributed to the development of boards of health in
southern states, and caused even the federal government to pay
more attention to public health issues. 18
Beyond yellow fever, however, the region also harbored
uniquely Southern afflictions that included malaria, hookworm
and pellagra. In addition, Southerners and all Americans suffered
from contagions such as typhoid, diphtheria, tuberculosis and
smallpox. The number of diseases unique to the South created the
image of a diseased region that undermined promotion of a New
South economy. The region's assorted boards of health attempted
to deal with both health and image problems under various constraints that included small budgets. These boards, in step with the
rest of the nation, involved themselves in sanitary cleanups, quarantines, and the building of isolation hospitals for victims of contagious diseases such as tuberculosis and smallpox. They also
passed mandatory reporting rules for doctors, printed and distributed educational pamphlets to inform and publicize health problems, and developed systems of health police powers that were,
arguably, the most rigorous in the country. Most of the health
rules and regulations had been codified and put into place across
the South long before the 1920s. Southerners, like many
Americans, did not like the intrusiveness or the publicity involved
in this public health movement. Florida was particularly sensitive
to the issues surrounding publicity, as became clear during the
smallpox outbreak of 1926. 19

18.

Humphreys, Yellow Fever and the South, 2, 9, 12-13, 176-77, 179-82, epilogue;
Grob, The Deadly Truth, 183-86.
19. James 0. Breeden, "Disease as a Factor in Southern Distinctiveness," in Disease
and Distinctiveness in the American South, eds. Todd L. Savitt and James Harvey
Young (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988), 8-9, 11-15; Elizabeth
W. Etheridge, "Pellagra: An Unappreciated Reminder of Southern
Distinctiveness," in Disease and Distinctiveness, 100-19; Elizabeth W. Etheridge,
The Butterfly Caste: A Social History of Pellagra in the South (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Publishing Company, 1972); Alan I. Marcus, "The South's Native
Foreigners: Hookworm as a Factor in Southern Distinctiveness" in Disease and
Distinctiveness, Savitt, 79-99; John Ettling, The Germ of Laziness: Rockefeller
Philanthropy and Public Health in the New South (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1981) ; Grob, TheDeadly Truth, 183-86; Roberts, Infectious Fear,
149; Humphreys, Yellow Fever in the South, 113-78; and Robert P. Ingalls, Urban
Vigilantes in the New South: Tampa, 1882-1936 (Knoxville: University of
Ten nessee Press, 1988).
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Florida's state Board of Health was established on February 20,
1889. It had been authorized earlier as a provision of the 1885 constitution that gave the state the power to establish an agency to
oversee the prevention and control of disease. The Florida legislature, however, did not utilize this legal authority until a yellow
fever epidemic hitJacksonville in 1888. Similar to the reactions of
other southern states to this disease and, partially as a result of
pressure from those states, Florida's lawmakers, in a special session
of the legislature, created a state board of health. 20
·
Article XV of the original constitutional provision, which was
now activated, set out the Board's mandate. It stated that the "State
Board of Health shall have supervision of all matters relating to
public health , with such duties, powers, and responsibilities as may
be prescribed by law. The county boards shall have such powers
and be under the supervision of the state board to such extent as
the legislature may prescribe." 21 The cities, some ofwhich already
had their own health boards, would also come under the supervision of the state board. The 1889 legislation fleshed out the rules,
regulations, and duties of the state board. In addition to the activities followed by most such agencies, Florida's health board would
formulate medical statistics, create a scientific laboratory (in
1903), sponsor bacteriological studies, publish health bulletins for
the general public (such as Florida Health Notes), and install a
bureaucratic health system to enforce medical regulations. By the
1920s, Florida had modernized its public health service in step
with the rest of the United States. 22
The initial reports of smallpox occurred in Tampa. By the first
week of January 1926 there were seven cases. By the end of the
month the total count had reached 122. On February 10 there
were between 181 and 185 cases, including both old and new victims. It should be noted that Miami at this point had 156 cases and
Jacksonville 80, although neither city had reported such figures. By
the end of May, according to the U.S. Public Health Service,

20.

21.
22.

William]. Bigler, "1 00 Years of Public Health in Florida: The First and Second
Quarters, 1889-1939," journal of the Florida Medical Association 76, no . 8 (August
1989), 694; Florida Handbook, 1947-1948 (Tallahassee, 1946), 86, 299, 369; and
Humphreys, Yellow Fever in the South, 119-26. The constitution went into effect
in 1886.
Florida Handbook, 1947-1948, 369.
Bigler, "100 Years of Public Health in Florida," 693-95; State Board of Health,
33rd Report, 10, 28. Florida Health Notes was introduced in 1892.
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Tampa had 466 smallpox cases and the disease had spread
throughout the state.23
Dr. D.C. Levy, the recently appointed city health officer, had
to deal with the Tampa epidemic. He had moved to the city in
September of 1925, having been lured from the health department in Richmond, Virginia. He was reputed to be the highest
paid city employee in the state of Florida, with a salary of $12,000
a year. 24 Levy launched a vigorous and controversial campaign to
combat the disease in a city in which only 15%-20% of the residents were properly vaccinated. While continually reassuring people that there was no cause for alarm, Levy put into motion a mass
vaccination drive, which, he hoped would contain the epidemic.
His insistence on publicizing the presence of smallpox proved to
be a crucial aspect of that drive. As he told an Associated Press
reporter on january 7, 1926, there was no need for panic "provided the people realize the importance of vaccination." Publicity,
therefore, was necessary in order to encourage vaccinations which
would stop the spread of the disease. 25
Levy established two free vaccination clinics, authorized the
supply of vaccine to city physicians and sent out circulars to all doctors urging them to contact their patients for vaccination or revaccination. In addition, he forwarded 3000 letters to city department
heads and employers suggesting that they encourage their workers
to get vaccinated. He and his staff also distributed over 20,000 letters to schools for students to take home. The letters stated that
students would be vaccinated for smallpox at their school unless
parents informed the principal that their child would not participate. Levy instructed owners of rooming and boarding houses to
report any smallpox cases on their premises. He also warned them
that if this was not done, their establishments would be placarded
with a warning about the presence of the disease. Finally, since no
isolation hospitals existed in the city, Levy assisted in setting up an
isolation camp for victims. The original camp consisted of fifteen

23.

U.S. Public Health Reports 41, no. 1 (January-June 1926) : 424, 1312; Southern
Medicaljournal (Aprill926): xix, 4, 324; JAMA 86, no. 7 (13 February 1926):
part I, 491, and 86, no. 10 (6 March 1926): part I, 696:, Tampa Tribune, 30
January and 10, 11 and 18 February 1926; and New York Times, 9 February
1926.
24. Tampa Tribune, 12 February 1926.
25. Tampa Tribune, 8 January and 3 February 1926. Some estimates of the numbers vaccinated were given at 20 %-25 %- still very low.
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tents, at a time when temperatures hovered around 37°F. He soon
initiated the building of a permanent structure to house patients.26
Yet, despite this flurry of letters, rules, and warnings, the number of smallpox cases continued to grow and by the end ofJanuary
only 50 % ofthe city's approximately 150,000 people were vaccinated, with 80% of that number consisting of school children. Levy
had wanted at least 80%-90% of the entire population vaccinated
in order to stop the epidemic in its tracks. 27 He became increasingly frustrated with the slowness of the process, stating "I do not
know how to present the case more strongly than I have already
done. Tampa could be absolutely free of smallpox in two weeks if
the job of vaccinating the people could be finished up." By early
February, Levy was angry over the attitudes of Tam pans:
The people in Tampa who have not yet been vaccinated,
in spite of five weeks ' effort to get them to realize the situation are beginning to pay the price of their folly.
Smallpox is continuing to increase, and, of course, everyone who has contracted the disease in the last three weeks
had ample opportunity to get protection early in January.
Tuesday twelve cases of smallpox were reported to the
Health Department. At least two of these individuals had
actually refused vaccination when offered it, one having
said he would rather go to jail than be vaccinated. Instead,
he has gone to the smallpox hospital and instead of having a sore arm for a few days and a small scar- a mark of
common sense-on his arm, his body is covered with a
loathsome eruption and he will have many scars for life. 28
Levy redoubled his efforts. He reissued all the circulars and letters.
He ordered a second round of school vaccinations and sent a
policeman to "assist" nurses in vaccinating dock workers in the
port. He pushed for some form of compulsory vaccination law and
even suggested that city employers should fire any of their employees who refused to be vaccinated. And, as he had done from the
26.

Tampa Tribune, 8, 9, 18, 19, 20, 26 January 1926; JAMA 86, no. 14 (3 April
1926): part II, 1079; Atlanta Constitution, 9 January 1926; News, 8 January 1926;
and New York Times, 8 and 15 January 1926.
27. Tampa Tribune, 18, 19, 20, 24, 29, 31 J anuary 1926; JAMA 86, no. 7 (13
February 1926): part 1,491 , and 86, no. 14 (3 April1926) : part II, 1079; and
Atlanta Constitution, 20 January 1926.
28. Tampa Tribune, 4 February 1926.
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start of the epidemic, he insisted on full disclosure and publicity in
the city's press to inform people of the disease's dangers and of the
ways to avoid it. It was this open policy, in particular, that produced
difficulties for Levy. Some citizens and city officials did not support
Levy's policy of advertising the presence of such a frightening disease as smallpox in Tampa. They were especially worried that such
adverse publicity would be picked up by the "Northern" press, ruin
the city's tourist season and, thus, seriously injure Tampa's economy.29
As early as the first ofJanuary with smallpox "bordering on epidemic," Levy asked the local press to publicize the outbreak, something that newspapers had largely avoided. 30 The Kiwanis
Club- the first to fire salvo against Levy's publicizing-immediately went on record as being against any such public discussion of the
disease or of any announcements concerning the number of cases
that had occurred. The Club formed a committee, headed by a
physician who was also a member of the Florida Medical Board of
Examiners, to ask for the reversal of Levy's policy. The committee
called on the newspapers to avoid any coverage of the smallpox
problem. 31 They hoped to avoid "Tampa getting unfair advertising
through the reports which are exaggerated by papers in the North
spreading propaganda adverse to Florida and Tampa." 32 As it
turned out, this particular committee ended up doing nothing
about the issue, but news of the club's attempt found its way onto
the wire services and into the national press. In fact, as will be seen,
the suggested cover-up turned into a bigger story than the smallpox itself. 33
Along with the Kiwanis Club's concerns over Levy's actions,
some members of Tampa's City Commission also expressed oppo29.

Tampa Tribune, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 23 , 24, and 27 January, 21 February, and 3
March 1926; Atlanta Constitution, 8 January 1926; Miami Daily News, 8 January
1926; and New York Times, 8 and 15 January 1926. For an overview of Florida's
land boom and bust, see: William W. Rogers, "Fortune and Misfortune," 287303; George, "Passage to the New Eden," 440-63; George, "Brokers, Binders,
and Builders," 27-51; Sessa, "Miami in 1926," 15-36; and Sessa "Anti-Florida
Propaganda," 41 -51.
30. Tampa Tribune, 28 December 1925, 8, 13, and 23 January 1926; and New York
Times, 8January 1926.
31. Atlanta Constitution, 8 January 1926; Tampa Tribune, 13, 24, and 26 January
1926; Miami Daily News, 8 January 1926; and New York Times, 15 January 1926.
32. Atlanta Constitution, 8 January 1926; and New York Times, 8 January 1926.
33. Tampa Tribune, 13, 14, 23 , 24, and 26 January 1926; and Miami Daily News, 8
and 12January 1926.
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s1t10n to any publicity of the epidemic. One city commissioner,
James McCants, evidently called for Levy's resignation. Although
he denied later that he had done so, McCants admitted that the
doctor's policy of giving out "spread-eagle stories" concerning
health conditions in the city displeased him. 34 His words also managed to find their way into northern newspapers. The New York
Times went so far as to suggest that the Ku Klux Klan might be
behind the attacks on Levy and that the Klan had disliked Levy's
appointment from the start, "for racial reasons." Thus, even veiled
hints of anti-Semitism crept into the smallpox debate. 35
Levy, however, won significant support for his open policies
from a number of important organizations, including the State
Board of Health, the county board of health and, on a national
level, the American Medical Association. Also, despite the views of
some, the majority of the city commission backed him and his controversial actions. He gained encouragement as well from letters
sent to him personally from other doctors and public health officials from around the nation, including the U.S Surgeon General,
Hugh S. Cumming. 36
City officials did not allow smallpox fears to cause the cancellation of two crowd-creating public events that were traditionally
held in Tampa during Lhe winter months. In early February both
the South Florida Fair, and even more importantly, the Gasparilla
Festival, complete with pirate invasion, took place as usual. The
Fair included a visiting delegation from Maine as well as a day
devoted to the attendance of thousands of Shriners. There was a
coronation ball for Gasparilla and press photographs that show
throngs of people lining city streets for the Gasparilla Parade.
Clearly, despite the contagious nature of smallpox, the tourist season and Tampa's public events had to go on. It was important to

34.

Miami Herald, 19 January 1926; Miami Daily News and Tampa Tribune, 12
January 1926; and New York Times, 12January 1926.
35. New York Times, 15 January 1926. For the KKK in Florida during the 1920s, see
David Chalmers, "The Ku Klux Klan in the Sunshine State: The 1920's,"
Florida Historical Quarterly 42, no. 3Qanuary 1964): 209-15. For the Klan in
Tampa, see Michael H. Mundt, "The Ku Klux Klan's 1926 Assault on the
Democratic Party in Hillsborough County, Florida," Tampa Bay History 19, no.
l(spring/summer 1997): 5-18.
36. Tampa Tribune, 9 and 20 January, and 21 February 1926; JAMA, 86, (6
February 1926): part I, 423; Miami Daily News, 12 January 1926; and New York
Times, 15January 1926.
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do so in order to show that there was nothing for visitors to fear in
Tampa. 37
The city's press also decided, after some hesitation, to follow
Levy's policy of openness. Mter a week of near silence, the most
important paper, the Tampa Tribune, routinely published news of
the epidemic and provided updates on the number of cases in the
city. This policy won praise from both Levy and the State Board of
Health in its official reports. The Surgeon-General's office also
lauded the paper's stand. 38 Still, some of the press reportage was
peculiar. For instance, on January 31 the Tribune ran a story on the
preparations for the upcoming "Carnival Days" including those
involving the Gasparilla Festival. Immediately adjacent to that article, publishers of the paper included another piece headlined
"Fight on Smallpox Not Yet Won, Levy Warns People Here," which
included the fact that there where now 133 cases of smallpox in
Tampa and that only 50% of the city's population was vaccinated.
There was no attempt to cross-reference the two stories or to suggest that there may be a potential health threat for visitors coming
to Tampa to join the crowds at the Fair and parade. 39
Despite the press disclosures of the epidemic, however, the
original hesitations and cover-up attempts, such as they were, set
the tone for coverage by the Northern press. It soon became
known that other Florida cities were experiencing smallpox outbreaks as well, a list that included Pensacola, Jacksonville, West
Palm Beach and a number of east coast towns. In addition, most of
these places had not been particularly forthcoming in their reporting on the situation. Of these cities, the most active offender in this
regard turned out to be Miami. News of Miami's epidemic originally broke in the pages of the New York Times and the Chicago
Tribune. 40 The disease had appeared in Miami well before any news
of it surfaced, as 14 cases had been confirmed in December of
1925. By January 19, 1926, the city had 45 verified cases.41
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.

Tampa Tribune, 31 January and 7, 8, 9, and 12 February 1926; and Florida
Health Notes 18, no. 3 (March 1926): 31-32.
Tampa Tribune, 22, 24, and 31 January, and 21 February 1926; and JAMA 86,
no.14 (3April1926): part II, 1079.
Tampa Tribune, 31January 1926.
Tampa Tribune, 3 February 1926; Chicago Tribune, 29 January 1926; and New
York Times, 29 January and 5 February 1926. The newspapers in West Palm
Beach and Jacksonville did not originally publish any reports about their own
city's smallpox outbreak.
New York Times, 29 January 1926.
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In late January an international aspect of the smallpox story
brought more unwanted attention. A British administrator in
the Bahamas announced a quarantine on all ships coming from
Florida. The reason listed was smallpox. The quarantine began
to halt shipping into and out of the Miami area, including illegal rum running from Bimini. Despite significant negotiation
and special pleading from Floridians, the quarantine stayed in
place until early May, 1926. The Miami Herald reported the quarantine on page fourteen of the paper and simply stated that the
British order "follows reports of communicable disease in some
Florida cities." The article did not specifically identify Miami or
mention smallpox. 4 2
Again, as in Tampa and other Florida cities, the smallpox
outbreak in Miami was of the milder Variola minor strain. In fact,
the similarities of the strains led some to claim later that smallpox had been imported into Miami from Tampa. However, this
idea was challenged by Miami's city health officer, Dr. ]. M.
Lowry, since the first victim was reported to have been a black
man who had arrived in Miami from Georgia. The medical
response to smallpox in Miami was similar to that of health officials in Tampa. As in Tampa, Miami also had no existing isolation hospital and one had to be hurriedly built. Consequently,
most of the first victims diagnosed in Miami were quarantined in
their own homes. Also, similar to Levy, Lowry began a program
of mass vaccination. At one point, Lowry's department vaccinated over 2,000 individuals per day. By the 1st week in January,
approximately 20% of the city's 20,000 school children had
received the vaccine, leading officials to send forms home with
students informing their parents of the vaccination program.
Unlike Levy, however, Miami public health authorities vaccinated children in school only if their parents ordered it to be done.
42.

For the quotation, see Miami Herald, 25 January 1926. Tampa Tribune, 27
January and 7 February 1926;JAMA, 86, no.6 (6 February 1926): part I, 423,
and 86, no. 26 (26 June 1926): part II, 1825; Southern Medical journal19, no. 3
(March 1926): 239; Chicago Tribune, 29 January 1926; Miami Daily News, 23
January 1926; and New York Times, 29January and 14 February 1926. For background on Florida prohibition and on smuggling from the Bahamas, see
James A. Carter III, "Florida Rumrunning During National Prohibition,"
Florida Historical Quarterly 48, no. 1 Quly 1969): 47-56; Patricia Buchanan,
"Miami's Bootleg Boom," Tequesta 30 (1970): 13-31; George, "Brokers,
Binders, and Builders," 45; and Rogers, "Fortune and Misfortune," 289.
Carter is particularly useful for the British view.
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The form had to be signed by parents and returned to the
school before their children could receive the treatment. City
employees received vaccinations and health workers tried to
convince private employers to have their workers vaccinated or
revaccinated. The result of all this medical activity was that about
30,000 residents (out of a population of 110,000) had been vaccinated by early February. 43
In Miami, and to a lesser extent in Tampa, city officials tended to emphasize the number of smallpox victims who were black
and who lived in segregated areas . In Miami it was true that most
of the cases had been reported from "Colored Town" in the
northwest part of the city. This fact could have been used, one
suspects, in order to play down the risk white tourists would face
when visiting the city, since they would be unlikely to venture
into that neighborhood. Certainly Miami's press, once it decided to report on smallpox at all, decided to highlight the racial
angle .44 Colored Town was the primary focus of a vigorous vaccination drive. In one three-day stretch, physicians, accompanied by policemen, moved through the area to vaccinate
residents. It is not clear whether such medical treatments were
voluntary, but the presence of the police indicates at least some
level of coercion. 45
This was not a surprise in Miami, for despite all of its 1920s
glamour and its growing population base, it was very southern in
many ways, especially regarding racial issues. An active Ku Klux
Klan group operated in the town to maintain an unofficial, but
rigid policy of residential segregation. In addition, ill feelings
based on a violent history existed between the black population
and the city's police force. Colored Town was a world onto itself,
one that was usually left out of the city's public services. This routine lack of official concern translated into unpaved streets, poor
sanitation, under-developed sewer connections, rundown housing,
and general overcrowding. Few medical facilities existed and those
that did were financially strapped. All of this helped the neighborhood become a potential source of epidemics which whites

43.
44.
45.

Miami Herald, 5 February 1926; and New York Times, 29 January 1926.
Tampa Tribune, 15 and 27 January 1926; Miami Daily News, 15 and 22January
1926; Miami Herald, 5 February 1926; and New York Times, 29 January 1926.
New York Times, 29 January and 12 February 1926.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol89/iss3/4

18

Jarvis: "Secrecy Has No Excuse": The Florida Land Boom, Tourism, and the

338

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

blamed on black lifestyles instead of the condition of municipal
services.46
The vaccination program in Colored Town also fit into the medical theories of the time concerning black Americans. A growing
perception in white, urban public health circles since the turn of the
century claimed that Mrican-Americans were more prone to diseases such as tuberculosis and smallpox because of their poor neighborhood environment and/ or their own personal health habits.
While very little was done in Miami, or elsewhere, to improve living
conditions in black areas of cities, many whites feared, ironically,
that the outbreak of contagious diseases in such areas could spread
throughout the city. In this analysis blacks became vectors of disease
that carried germs or viruses into white neighborhoods in the bodies of a black work force that moved into all parts of white society.
They labored in a city like Miami during the day and returned to the
"colored" sections at night. Maids, chauffeurs, hotel workers, cooks,
nursemaids, construction hands-all were perceived as potential carriers of diseases such as smallpox. Of particular concern were black
laundresses who washed white residents' clothes in Colored Town
and then returned them to white Miami. Such clothes could be
infected with smallpox. Thus, the vaccination of the black neighborhoods of Miami, with the use of police, was seen as a necessary preventative to stopping smallpox from engulfing the entire city.
Miami's authorities acted not only within the racial assumptions of a
southern city of the era but also within the views of modern public
health theories involving race in the 1920s.47
46.

47.

For the description and analysis of Miami's main black neighborhood, see
Paul S. George, "Colored Town: Miami 's Black Community, 1896-1930,"
Florida Historical Quarterly 56, no. 4 (April 1978): 432-4 7 overall and 443-46 for
the 1920s specifically. Also important for this discussion is Paul S. George,
"Policing Miami's Black Community, 1896-1930," Florida Historical Quarterly
57, no. 4 (April 1979): 434-50. See also, Melanie Shell-Weiss, Coming To
Miami: A Social History (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), 62, 71.
For a large r picture of black urban life in the South, consult Howard N.
Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865-1890 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1978) ,) 120-24; Brown, "C rime, Commerce, and
Contagionism," 61-62. These types of conditions continued on long after the
1920s. See The Florida State Planning Board, Planning Your Vacation in
Florida, Miami and Dade County, 1941, 4-5, that described Colored Town as
"characterized by rows of wretched shacks and worse living conditions, attended by unrest and disease . .. "
Roberts, Infectious Fear, 82,150-53,171-72,176, 184-85;Jones, Bad Blood, 30-31,
41-44; Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South, 121-22; Brown, "Crime,
Commerce, and Contagionism," 60-61, 70-71; Shell-Weiss, 47, 58, 61, 71;

Published by STARS, 2010

19

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 89 [2010], No. 3, Art. 4

SECRECY HAs No ExcusE

339

As health officials implemented their strategies, some
Miamians made a concerted effort to keep news of smallpox out of
the press. As in Tampa, a fear that perceived northern propagandists would use the epidemic as another weapon to criticize Miami
specifically, and Florida in general, drove the efforts to limit knowledge of the epidemic. And, once more, there was the concern that
such negative publicity would destroy the tourist season. This feeling was, if anything, particularly intense in Miami, the epicenter of
the early 1920s land and tourist boom. However, as happened in
Tampa, attempts to conceal facts about a smallpox epidemic
proved to be counterproductive.
Anyone reading Miami's newspapers in early 1926 would have
a difficult time discovering that the city was in the midst of a smallpox outbreak. The Miami News ran small stories on the disease on
January 15 and 22 and again on February 6, but few updates were
provided and the number of cases was not disclosed.48 No notices
appeared offering specific medical advice or vaccination information. The Miami Herald published even less on the subject, remaining virtually mute during the month of january. There were reports
that when smallpox first appeared in the city, the editors of the two
newspapers conferred with city officials and made the decision not
to print any news concerning the progress of the epidemic. 49 If
true, this policy ran counter to the wishes of both city and state
health authorities who claimed, as Levy had in Tampa, that publicity was necessary in order to warn the population and to stimulate
vaccination drives.5° But it was just this type of reporting that most
troubled hotel owners, real estate operators, and the chamber of
commerce. These groups felt that Miami should not provide negative news stories that could devastate the city's economy. 51
Along with the virtual newspaper silence, a problem arose on
the issue of discrepancies in the number of smallpox victims. Once
news of the epidemic finally surfaced, a numbers game became
Leavitt, "Be Be Safe, Be Sure," 105-09; Hewitt, Southern Discomfort, 251, 266-67;
and Roderick Waters, "Dr. William B. Sawyer of Colored Town," Tequesta 57
(1997): 68, 73.
48. Quotation from Miami Herald, 25 January 1926. Miami Daily News, 9 January
1926; Tampa Tribune, 22 January 1922, 23 and 30 January 1926; and New Yo-rk
Times, 9 February 1926.
49. Tampa Tribune, 22, 23, and 30 January 1926, January and 1, and 3 February
1926; and New York Times, 9 February 1926.
50. Editorial, Tampa Tribune, 23 January 1926. See also 24 and 30 January 1926.
51. Tampa Tribune, 22 , 23, and 24January 1926.
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another bit of evidence that a cover-up was in progress. Figures
presented by the U.S. Public Health Service proved lower than
those recorded by city health officials and local physicians. This
confusing situation may have been abetted by the anti-publicity faction who wanted to lessen the public relations fallout of the epidemic by lowering the number of cases in the city, especially
through national Public Health Service notices. 52 Interestingly,
this did not impress the Florida State Health Officer, Dr. B.L.
Arms, who claimed in a state-wide medical report that:
There have been a few (cities) that have not reported or
have reported less than [a] dozen cases (of smallpox).
One city that had reported less than [a] dozen cases .. . has
had over 40 cases according to a personal letter from the
city physician. Another city from which not a case has
been reported has had about 20 ... and still another city
reporting less than 10 has had nearly 40. All of these differing figures added to the obfuscation surrounding the
epidemic and made it difficult to determine the actual
state of affairs in Florida. 53
All of his produced even more damning national press coverage.
The New York Times castigated Florida in a February editorial entitled, "Secrecy Has No Excuse." The editorial proclaimed that "concealment of an infectious disease is a policy equally stupid and
dangerous." Later, when Surgeon-General Cumming was asked
about the reports of discrepancies involving Florida's smallpox
outbreak, he noted the statistics used by his U.S. Public Health
Reports had been from "state and local authorities." 54 He pointedly did not say that they had originated with state and local health
authorities whose figures were routinely higher than those offered
up by politicians at any levei. 55

52.
53.

54.
55.

Tampa Tribune, 24January 1926.
Tampa Tribune, 15, 17, 23, and 28 January, 17 February, and 3 March 1926;
and Chicago Tribune, 28 February 1926. An overview of this attitude in 1926
Florida can be obtained from Sessa, "Anti-Florida Propaganda," 45-51 ";
George, "Brokers, Binders, and Builders," 46-49; George, "Passage to the New
Eden," 456-458; Rogers, "Fortune and Misfortune," 294-97;Jarvis, "Foreigners
from the Far North," 64-66; and Vickers, Panic in Paradise.
Florida Health Notes 18, no.1 / 3: 14-15; Tampa Tribune, 9, 14January, and 1, 11
February 1926; and New York Times, 15January and 9 February 1926.
Tampa Tribune, 6 February 1926; Rogers, 288.
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An intrastate issue involving smallpox and its publicity also
emerged. While Tampa's press ran stories on their city's epidemic,
Miami and Jacksonville newspapers also published stories about
Tampa's smallpox problems, even as they ignored their own outbreaks. The Miami Herald alluded, for instance, to an "epidemic
that has been raging in that city (Tampa) for weeks." 56 This passage was written, of course, at the same time that smallpox had broken out in Miami. Smallpox, could be used as a means of
undercutting a sister city and a study of the outbreak can shed light
on this urban infighting within Florida. The Tribune managed to
turn the tables on its rivals once it discovered the truth from the
State Board of Health.57 At that point, the Tribune unleashed a
number of outraged editorials denouncing what it called "contemptible unfairness" in the selective reporting by other Florida
newspapers. News of this squabble also ended up on the AP wires
and spread across the nation. 58
The role and response of the State Board of Health provided
another source of controversy. It had to be asked specifically for
figures on the presence of smallpox in various cities by a newspaper enquiry. Only when so pinned did the Board claim to be
unhappy with Miami and other cities for suppressing the facts and
pleased with Tampa's openness. Clearly, the Board had not been
prepared to "blow the whistle" and name cities and their public
officials that attempted to conceal an epidemic. 59 The state health
officer's comments regarding Board policy indicated that it had
decided not to interfere with actions pursued by Miami and other
cities because of a disinclination to mix in local affairs. He added
that the Board remained ready to provide data about any state
health matter, but that it could not take part in any controversy
between cities or localities within the state. 60 Evidently, this held
true even if such a passive policy endangered lives.
Taken in its entirety, the smallpox epidemic of 1926 can be
inserted into the context of contemporary Florida. It can also be
used as a means to understand that context more fully. Public
health issues competed with the financial health of the tourist driven economy that was already declining after the boom period of
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Tampa Tribune, 6 February 1926.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the early 1920s. Headlines in the nation's press had ceased playing
up the boom and instead had begun to criticize the state for its
problems. Many Floridians believed this criticism to be unfair and
inaccurate and they feared that it could add to and accelerate the
malaise. 51 It was within this framework that all the controversy concerning publicizing the epidemic took place. The fears of promoters in the business and political realm could, on occasion, square
off against the fears of health workers regarding the spread and
medical impact of the disease. Publicity could help stem smallpox
but it could also exacerbate the ills of an economic downturn.
However, as was learned by a number of Florida cities, attempts to
suppress that publicity could also be injurious to economic health.
Overall, Florida's public health officials generally acted in the
best interest of Florida's citizens, and they followed mainstream
medical procedures when combating the smallpox outbreak, even,
as certainly happened in other areas of the country, when faced
with political opposition. It should also be noted that while some
business and political leaders' reactions may appear irresponsible,
they did reflect legitimate concerns about the state's and individual cities' economic welfare. A policy of silence was perhaps made
a little more supportable due to the fact that the outbreak was the
Variola minor strain. Thus, publicity opponents knew that they were
attempting to play down a mild form of the disease, one that would
cause few deaths. They tended to overlook the problem of distinguishing Variola minor from the more dangerous Variola major and
the possibility, feared by doctors, that the two strains might be
mixed together. State boosters were correct in claiming that
Florida was getting worse press than, say, California with its concurrent Variola major epidemic. In that sense, their frustration was justified. 62 The question remains, however, do any of these
extenuating circumstances justify a policy of secrecy involving an
epidemic disease? In the end, the controversy amounted to a
debate between those who focused primarily on physical health

61.

Tampa Tribune, 1517,23, and 28January, 17 February, and 3 March 1926; and
Chicago Tribune, 28 February 1926. For an overview of this attitude in 1926
Florida, see Sessa, "Anti-Florida Propaganda," 45-51; George, "Brokers,
Binders, and Builders," 46-49; George, "Passage to the New Eden ," 456-58;
Rogers, "Fortune and Misfortune," 294-97; Jarvis, "Foreigners from the Far
North," 64-66; and Vickers, Panic in Paradise.
62. Florida Health Notes 18, no.1; 3, 14-15; Tampa Tribune, 9, 14January and 1, 11
February 1926; and New York Times, 15 January and 9 February 1926.
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and those who focused primarily on fiscal health. It was a debate
that many communities have had to grapple with during an epidemic, but it was particularly heated in a state like Florida in the
mid-1920s whose economy was dominated by tourism.
This issue of economy versus public health can be summed up
by the actions and words of Florida's governor, John W. Martin.
During the first week of February 1926, Martin announced that he
and his officials would be vaccinated for smallpox. He was doing so
to set an example for Floridians but he also claimed that it was simply a precaution and not an indication that the state actually faced
a serious smallpox outbreak. 63 His announcement contained reassurances for both sides in the smallpox debate, explaining, "While
convinced that smallpox has made scant inroads into Florida's
daily life , he had requested Dr. F. A. Brink, of the State's Bureau
of Communicable Diseases, to conduct a vaccination at capital
town. The Governor's own arm will receive the virus along with
that of other officials and employees." 64
Accompanying this news was a more economically driven message stating that "relatively little smallpox exists in Florida" and
that he was assured "the state's subtropical climate and the outdoor habits of the people act against the disease." 65 Following that
bit of medical nonsense, Martin proceeded to establish a case that
vaccination would help Florida defend itself in the long run
against its rivals and enemies. He then interestingly noted, "I have
just learned from Dr. Brink that only a small percentage of
Florida's people are vaccinated. This is a flagrant negligence in
protecting the health of the individual, the appearance and beauty of our boys and girls and the fair name of our state." 66 He continued, managing to blend both the issues of public health and
public relations into one unifying theme:
We are now a cosmopolitan community. Just as long as
there exists in any state in the Union a case of this disease,
it may be brought to us. In failing to vaccinate we have laid
the fair name of our state open to adverse publicity by our
jealous enemies. I feel intolerant of all city and state offi-
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cials in school and health work who do not immediately
put into effect a vaccination program that will eliminate
all opportunity of giving others a chance to criticize us .67
It was a masterful solution to the smallpox controversy- vaccinate
in order to stop the disease and in order to stop outsiders from
attacking Florida.
Florida's problems during the smallpox epidemic of 1926 can
be seen as part of a wider southern dislike of Northern press
reports about the region as a whole. During the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, many Southerners became defensive
about outside criticism. The South's "otherness" within the national mainstream was routinely highlighted by the northern press that
focused on its grinding poverty, social backwardness, evangelical
religious beliefs, and racial policies. In addition, the South's
allegedly peculiar, even bizarre, diseases also figured into this critique. The region suffered such afflictions as yellow fever, malaria,
hookworm, and pellagra, all of which were unique in the nation
and many of which were caused by either the environment or the
level of sanitation found in the South. The 1920s marked a low
point in Southern image making as the Ku Klux Klan, the Scopes
trial, and the writings of H. L. Mencken all contributed to the
region's status as a strange and incomprehensible place. Many
Southerners, of course, were offended by these views, seeing the
South as modern and improved. They were particularly angry over
attacks on their way of life and the quality of their society. Within
that context they grew increasingly embarrassed by health problems and often denied their seriousness or even their existence.68
Florida has had a distinct pattern of image anxiety and denial
responses regarding both natural disasters and epidemic diseases.
Both the Tampa Bay and Miami/South Florida regions have a history of downplaying any event that could cut into their publicityfuelled prosperity. Their reaction to bad press reports was directly
67.
68.
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linked to the state's overall service-driven, tourist based economy.
Miami was, arguably, more vulnerable and dependent on such factors than the more industrialized and diversified Tampa. In both
cities, however, some business people and their chambers of commerce believed that saying less about a bad situation was better
than allowing negative news stories to leak out. They were joined
in this by real estate promoters, hotel owners and most politicians.
For instance, during the yellow fever epidemic of 1887-1888 in
Tampa, there concern was expressed early on that any news of a
possible outbreak of the disease would seriously hurt hotel development, especially the planned hotel proposed by Henry Plant.
Based on this perspective, confirmation of an outbreak was prudently delayed until the yellow fever cases could no longer be
ignored. 59
During the 1920s hurricanes were a source of potentially damaging press reports on Florida. As a result, following Tampa's 1921
hurricane, news was managed and the storm's impact was minimized so as not to curtail the emerging land boom in and around
the city. There were serious worries that "wild rumors" concerning
significant destruction in the wake of the hurricane would be
believed in the rest of the country. Thus, there was a move to mobilize a vigorous booster campaign to counter such rumors. There
was even an attempt to highlight California's natural disasters in
order to shift attention away from Florida. Similar tactics were utilized after Miami's September 1926 hurricane. As before,
Floridians complained of misleading and overly negative news
items in northern papers. Public relations efforts were unleashed
that included discouraging any Red Cross aid that could emphasize the degree of destruction and distress in the city. The message
went forth quickly through speeches, meetings in the North, and
in newspaper ads placed in the nation's press that Miami was open
for business and that the winter season would go on as usual.
These tactics of downplaying or suppressing bad news also
occurred during the 1962 encephalitis epidemic in St. Petersburg,
when actions were taken to muffle the facts by curbing or totally
stopping too detailed or pessimistic medical reports about the out-
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break. The fear, as always, was that unnecessary frankness would
hurt the boom times of the 1960s. 70
Thus, the policy that followed, or at least was sometimes suggested, during the smallpox epidemic of 1926 fit a pattern that
runs through modern Florida history. Economic concerns influenced these patterns, but the ongoing regional defensiveness of
the South as a whole, especially in the face of hostile or derisive
attitudes coming from the North also played a significant role .
Smallpox, when analyzed within this context, appears to symbolize
yet another aspect of southern regional identity and sensitivity. In
Florida's case, however, it also represented a direct attack on the
tourist based, publicity driven economy that the state had adopted
and had to protect.
70.
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